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Executive Summary 
 
This paper explores the concept of hate speech, both theoretically and within 
WKHFRQWH[WRIWKH0H&R'(0SURMHFW¶VIRXUFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHV(J\SW Kenya, Serbia 
and South Africa. Instead of seeking to provide an objective definition of hate speech, 
WKH SDSHU¶V HPSLULFDO DSSURDFK KLJKOLJKWV WKDW FRQWH[W PDWWHUV 0RUH VSHFLILFDOO\
analysis of the political and socio-economic context in which the speech act occurs 
and consideration of the nature of the speaker and audience ± including their impact 
and transmission ± allows for a nuanced and informed approach to evaluate hate 
speech, and how this impacts democratisation processes. 
 
The paper presents: 
x A general discussion of freedom of speech and its relationship with hate 
speech; 
x A brief discussion on the definitions of hate speech and international legislation; 
x A short discussion of hate speech in the four country contexts of the MeCoDEM 
project: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper will address the topic of hate speech as a key concept in the Media, 
Conflict and Democratisation (MeCoDEM) project. In general, hate speech can be 
broadly defined as a speech act that antagonises or marginalises people based on 
their identification with a particular social or demographic group. It is the result of 
communication processes that compromise human dignity, equality and human rights. 
However, definitions of hate speech can be contentious and problematic, given 
tensions between the labelling of a harmful speech act as such, which has the potential 
to antagonise or marginalise an individual or group, and those speech acts that 
contribute to a pluralistic debate on a particular issue. An examination of hate speech 
is therefore highly contextual, and defining it in absolute terms can present 
complicated philosophical discussions on the meaning of belonging, freedom of 
expression and dignity within a given culture or society. Furthermore, it can be shaped 
and influenced by the unique media landscape in specific country contexts ± amplified 
by the growing usage of social media. This paper offers a brief background of hate 
speech in the context of freedom of speech and international legislation. Hate speech 
is then discussed in relation to the four case study countries that comprise the studies 
within the MeCoDEM project: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. 
 
2. Freedom of speech 
 
The term ³IUHHGRPRIVSHHFK´LVXVHGWRFDSWXUHWKRVHGLVFXUVLYHDFWV± often 
political in nature ± that can be imparted or received, without constraint or censorship, 
particularly on the part of government authorities. It is also known according to other 
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terms suFKDV³IUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQ´RULQFHUWDLQOHJLVODWLYHFRQWH[WV³IUHHGRPRI
the press´. These can be in the form of spoken or written words, but can also be 
actions or thoughts expressed through artistic or performative means. Indeed, any 
channel can communicate these speech acts, including print, visual, broadcast, and 
online media. Freedom of speech is therefore a layered and multi-faceted concept, 
and encompasses several debates on fundamental political concepts and 
philosophies, their interpretation, as well as their regulation.  
 
Tensions between hate speech and freedom of speech become apparent with 
VSHHFKDFWVWKDWLQWHQWLRQDOO\VHHNWRYLRODWHRUGHQLJUDWHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VPHPEHUVKLS
to a particular socio-economic, demographic or political group. Navigating through 
these tensions invites a consideration of the repercussions of limiting or encouraging 
freedom of expression, including the defence of hate speech, and whether or not this 
VLJQLILFDQWO\DIIHFWVDSHUVRQRUJURXS¶VULJKWWRKXPDQGLJQLW\(Barendt, 2005: 5). The 
universal right to ³KXPDQGLJQLW\´ is therefore intrinsically connected to the protection 
of fundamental political rights and freedoms. Freedom of speech and hate speech 
then becomes a point of contention when the balance between opinion and violations 
of human dignity are shifted, raising the issue of hate speech and international 
legislation. 
 
 3. Hate speech and international legislation 
 
Hate speech is a type of discriminatory speech that arises when people from 
different social, ethnic, or religious groups interact with one another, or when one such 
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group asserts its power over others. There are many different ways of describing hate 
speech in more detail, but one definition is as follows: 
  
Hate speech is defined as a bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at 
a person or a group of people because of some of their actual or perceived 
innate characteristics. It expresses discriminatory, intimidating, disapproving, 
antagonistic, and/or prejudicial attitudes toward those characteristics, which 
include gender, race, religion, ethnicity, color, national origin, disability, or 
sexual orientation. Hate speech is aimed to injure, dehumanize, harass, 
intimidate, debase, degrade, and victimize the targeted groups and to foment 
insensitivity and brutality against them (Cohen-Almagor, 2013: 43). 
 
The above description is a thorough explanation of how hate speech can be 
understood. Establishing a definition, however, is one element in understanding hate 
speech. How it is negotiated within a particular context, in a given society and at a 
particular point in time is equally important. An understanding of the political and socio-
economic context in which the hate speech act occurs should also be supplemented 
with an analysis of the speaker and audience to fully gauge the likely impact of the 
GLVFRXUVH)RUH[DPSOH%HQHVFK¶V(2013) dangerous speech framework also allows 
for analysis of the speaker and the degree of influence they have over the audience; 
the grievances and fears that the audience may have that the speaker is able to 
cultivate in the message; and the mode of dissemination, which may be influential in 
itself. 
 
1HJRWLDWLQJKDWHVSHHFK LVDGHOLFDWHPDWWHUEHFDXVH ³IURPDKXPDQ ULJKWV
perspective, the right to life and the prohibition of discrimination are to be balanced 
DJDLQVW WKH IUHHGRP RI H[SUHVVLRQ´ (Buyse, 2014: 796), and the sometimes 
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consequential need for tolerance of these multiple expressions. 1  In this way, a 
controversial case could be made for the protection of speech acts that are often 
divisive. Protecting hate speech, however, presents the risk of prejudices becoming 
entrenched in pluralistic societies (Hirvonen, 2013), which then compromise concepts 
of human dignity, defamation and human rights (Leo et al., 2011). Still, protecting hate 
VSHHFKGRHVQRWRQO\SURWHFWWKHVSHDNHU¶VULJKWVEXWDOVRDOORZVWKHWDUJHWRIWKHVH
VSHHFKDFWVWR³VSHDNEDFN´(Mårtensson, 2013). Freedom of speech principles then 
need to be balanced by considering whether or not these speech acts are offensive or 
incite violence (Tsesis, 2013), and so the question of legalisation comes into play. 
  
When we think about legislation, established laws and judicial systems are 
heavily reliant on Western paradigms, frameworks and institutions. American courts 
have been contending with issues on free speech for a few hundred years, whereas 
the European courts have been dealing with them within the last seven decades 
(Barendt, 2005: 55). When considering hate speech, there is a need to remember that 
human rights law does not dictate that freedom of expression is an unconditional right. 
Freedom of expression can be limited by protocols determined by documents like the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPPR), the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR), and the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) 
(Buyse, 2014: 791). With regards to discrimination, Article 20(2) of the ICPPR states: 
³$Q\ DGYRFDF\ RI QDWLRQDO UDFLDO RU UHOLJLRXV KDWUHG WKDW FRQVWLWXWHV LQFLWHPHQW WR
discriPLQDWLRQKRVWLOLW\RUYLROHQFHVKDOOEHSURKLELWHGE\ODZ´(OHCHR, 1976). Further 
clauses on racial discrimination are also found in the International Convention for the 
                                                          
1
 For a thorough discussion on these themes, see: Hare, I. and Weinstein, J. eds. 2009. Extreme 
Speech and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (OHCHR, 1969). It is also evident that 
much has been written in the American and European contexts (Bleich, 2011), 
resulting in a need for more discussion in the non-Western contexts. 
 
4. In context: four countries 
 
The cases discussed in this paper offer much material that contributes to 
discussions on the media and free speech in general, and more specifically, themes 
on hate speech and international legislation on discriminatory speech. These 
GLVFXVVLRQV KRZHYHU SULPDULO\ RFFXU IURP D ³:HVWHUQ´ SHUVSHFWLYH ZKLFK LV
influenced by several factors: Western thought and philosophy, the Western model of 
political construction of democracy, and presumptions of what it means to have 
freedom and liberty of expression in these contexts. All of these tie into the role of the 
media and how these influence (or impede) the roles of citizenship and cultural 
LGHQWLWLHV7KH0H&R'(0SURMHFW¶VDLPKRZHYHULVWRORRNDWFLYLFFRQIOLFWVLQFRXQWU\
contexts that are ± to varying degrees ± to be viewed from other perspectives than the 
³:HVWHUQ´RQH. The selected countries are unique because they are in various stages 
of political development, where they are either negotiating democratisation, or in the 
process of democratising7KHPHGLDSOD\DIXQGDPHQWDOUROHKHUHEHFDXVH³ZLWKRXW
doubt, freedom of speech and a free press are among the major achievements of 
democratisation. But the experience of many emerging democracies implies that 
under certain circumstances the media can also turn into an obstructive force that 
sharpens conflicts and might even trigger YLROHQFH´(MeCoDEM, 2015).2 This paper 
                                                          
2
 For more information about the MeCoDEM project, please visit: www.mecodem.eu. 
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will now discuss these discussions in the contexts of the four countries of the 
MeCoDEM project: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. 
 
In the case of Egypt, we see that after the uprisings in January 2011, media 
freedom has been in flux, where discourses on contentious issues have become highly 
politicised and polarised. When we discuss hate speech in the Egyptian context, the 
matter of negative attention to religious groups and social minorities has played a key 
role in facilitating this media politicisation and polarisation. This in turn is affected by 
laws, which seemingly favour certain religions, leaving members of other religious 
communities as well as minority groups vulnerable to lack of protections that would 
otherwise be enforced by national and international laws on discriminatory speech. 
 
The Kenyan case discusses the suppression of speech and what this means 
for a democratic participation of citizens in the media, as well as responsible 
journalistic practices. Kenya is a richly diverse nation, comprising of many languages 
and ethnic groups; some of which were the focus of directed hate speech and 
incitement to hatred during the 2007 elections. These sensitive issues, paired with a 
history of violent elections, mean that suppressing the media, even if it is for the 
³JUHDWHUJRRG´LQWXUQSUHYHQWHGGHPRFUDWic and legitimate discourses on politics in 
Kenyan society from taking place during the 2013 elections. 
 
The Serbian case has to do with a legacy of struggle after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, and the consequential establishment of a new government. During 
0LORãHYLü¶V UHJLPH WKHXVHRISURSDJDQGDFLWLQJ ³WKHHQHP\´DQGPDQLSXODWLRQRI
mainstream media was prevalent. After 2000, we see that the struggle for power and 
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conflict between political parties involved, normatively speaking, quite moderate use 
of language in the public domain, with hidden messages that often forged fear of each 
other. The lack of sustainable policy protecting the media has resulted in it not only 
receiving the lack of attention and funding needed for a robust media system, but also 
losing its status as a forum for democratic debate. This has resulted in acts of hate 
speech being prevalent in tabloids and the online milieu today, consequentially 
requiring a growing need for external support for projects educating the public on 
discriminatory speech and media literacy. 
 
The case of South Africa presents unique challenges in delineating hate 
speech, due to the relationship between its recent history of the abolition of state-
sanctioned racial segregation and racial repression known as Apartheid, and its 
current state as a nation in democratic transition. The South African case is unusual 
because it is one of the rare circumstances where suppressing speech (in some cases, 
speech which has been normalised for generations), is required to protect the dignity 
of members of the community in post-Apartheid terms, however, this suppression also 
can be interpreted as going against fundamental principles of freedom of thought and 
of expression; which are needed in order to foster a pluralistic environment. 
 
Each of the sections that follow aim to shed light on the complex issue of 
negotiating and understanding language and conflicts that involve discriminatory 
speech and hate speech. The central threads that can be seen between these cases 
are the roles of ethnicity, religious affiliation and/or identity in politics, and how conflicts 
arise in cultures and societies that already suffer from profound divisions. These 
divisions are the result of a volatile history and sensitive issues to do with collective 
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and cultural memory. They are also consequences of divisions brought on by 
democracies that are in flux due to an ever-present struggle between political powers 
and an increasingly challenging civil society. 
 
4.1. Egypt: Hate speech in the post-January 25th Uprising (Yosra El Gendi) 
Since the January 25th Uprising in 2011, various forms of hate speech have 
been on the rise in Egyptian media. These can be divided into xenophobic, political, 
religious and cultural forms. Politically-induced hate speech contains hate speech 
against political groups for their political opinions (Zahraa, 2014: 162-174). It also 
includes hate speech based on nationalist discourses against some Arab nationals. 
Xenophobic hate speech is hate speech that incites the hatred or rejection of 
foreigners, particularly Westerners. Cultural forms of hate speech include forms of 
hate speech against religious groups, particularly religious minority groups (Allam, 
2014), ethnic groups as well hate speech against members of the Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community. This section will first examine some of 
the conditions leading to the upsurge of hate speech since 2011. Secondly, it will 
examine how hate speech is treated by Egyptian laws and examine the ways these 
laws are implemented. 
  
Political hate speech: There are several factors that led to the increase of 
political forms of hate speech in the aftermath of the January 25th Uprising. First, a 
VWDWHRI ³FKDRWLFH[SUHVVLRQRIRSLQLRQV´ UHVXOWHG from the deposal of the Mubarak 
regime, and this was paired with low professional standards and professional ethics 
(Issawi, 2014: 69-70). This in turn led to an increase of unsubstantiated accusations 
and hate speech in the media discourse against political groups and political figures 
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(Zahraa, 2014: 178-179). Second, a variety of studies has pointed out that media 
ownership led to the lack of autonomy in Egyptian media. This led to a situation of 
media politicisation, which influenced its reporting (Issawi, 2014: 54). The political 
polarisation at WKHHQGRI3UHVLGHQW0RUVL¶V UXOHDQd the aftermath of the June 30th 
countrywide protests meant that both political groups resorted to extreme discourses 
against each other. It was not unusual to find different forms of conspiracy theories 
and unsubstantiated generalised claims circulating throughout the media, which were 
directed against specific political groups (Zahraa, 2014: 175-180). This also led to 
various forms of hate speech against members of different religious groups, 
particularly Christians; which resulted in several communal attacks against them in the 
DIWHUPDWKRI3UHVLGHQW¶V0RUVL¶VGHSRVDO(EIPR, 2014: 70-75). 
 
Nationalist hate speech: While political hate speech targets Egyptian opposition 
figures, factions or dissident nationalists, nationalist hate speech is a form of politically 
motivated hate speech that is mostly directed against Arab state nationals, for their 
political opinions on Egyptian politics and loyalty to one side or the other. The 
nationalist discourse, highlighting the strength of Egyptians to build their nation was 
also based on a strong conspiracy theory relating to WKH H[WHUQDO ³HQHPLHV RI WKH
QDWLRQ´7KLVLVPDLQO\GLUHFWHGDJDLQVWWKH6\ULDQDQG3Dlestinian residents (Uthman, 
2014). TV hosts hurled threats at Syrian refugees if they intervened in Egyptian politics 
or took sides. A former parliamentarian appearing on TV has also called for imposing 
the death penalty on any non-Egyptian joining the protests. Hate speech against the 
Palestinian community has been based on accusations pertaining to the relationship 
between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (Uthman, 2014). Nationalist hate speech 
is different from the xenophobic discourse that is based on colonial legacies.  
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Xenophobic hate speech: Xenophobic hate speech has increased since the 
January 25th Uprising. While xenophobic hate speech may emerge in periods of 
national crisis, different levels of xenophobia are rooted in an anti-colonial discourse 
that aims at liberating the Egyptian nation from the trends of Westerners and to 
maintaining local customs and traditions. After the January 25th Uprising, the rise in 
this discourse was partially a result of attempts to discredit democratic ideas and 
supporters of the uprising as being Westernised and thus inauthentic. This was also 
manifested in advertisements on TV that warned of the dangers of giving information 
to foreigners, perceived as potential spies (Uthman, 2014). In the case of a crackdown 
on civil society in 2011, a number of international NGOs (including the National 
Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, Freedom House, Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation and others) were accused of operating illegally in Egypt (El 
Taraboulsi et al., 2013: 11), was an extension to this discourse. Thus, the increase of 
xenophobic sentiments after the January 25th Uprising in 2011 was conducive to the 
increase of xenophobic hate speech.  
 
Hate speech against religious groups: Cases of religious blasphemy underwent 
a qualitative change after the January 25th Uprising. Prior to the uprising, reported 
cases of religious blasphemy were directed against notable thinkers, such as writers 
and novelists, as a way of restricting their freedom of conscience and freedom of 
expression. This was usually coupled with religious figures declaring them infidels, 
therefore constituting a lethal threat to them. In addition to notable thinkers, cases of 
blasphemy were also mostly directed against adherents of the non-Sunni Islamic faith 
(Ibrahim, 2013: 8). Investigating authorities resorted to questioning suspects on their 
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beliefs and faith, which was in violation of their right to privacy and freedom of 
conscience (Ezzat, 2014: 23). In the aftermath of the January 25th Uprising, there was 
a marked increase in reported cases of religious blasphemy. They rose particularly 
during periods surrounding political events, possibly due to the increased politicisation 
of religion. The cases extended to including petty fights between people, which 
developed into attacks on religions, or political discussions that were then interpreted 
as attacks on a religion. There was a noted failure by security forces which neglected 
to secure the protection of those accused of blasphemy from attacks by the wider 
community, for both the accused and their families (Ibrahim, 2013: 8-9). 
 
A heated debate is whether certain forms of speech constitute hate speech 
against religious groups or criticisms against religion. This debate is based on different 
cultural perceptions. For example, the French magazine Charlie Hebdo¶V VDWLULFDO
cartoons of Islamic figures is considered by state-owned Egyptian newspaper al-
Ahram, to be a form of contempt of religion and a misuse of freedom of expression. A 
number of al-Ahram articles stated that the failure of restricting insults to religions is 
the reason behind the January 2015 attacks on Charlie Hebdo¶VRIILFHVLQ3DULV(Al-
Sheikh, 2015). This is based on the understanding that the critiques of religion are not 
targeting the religion itself but the adherent of the religious creed, constituting hate 
speech. While Western notions stress the concept of freedom of expression when 
referring to Charlie Hebdo, it has been interpreted differently in other contexts. 
 
The case for religious blasphemies, primarily against Islam, has led to much 
popular upheaval, which was promptly addressed by authorities. However, hate 
speech against other religious minority groups is rarely prosecuted. For example, an 
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anti-Muslim movie, Innocence of Muslims, was circulated on YouTube and provoked 
mass protests mobilised by the Islamist community in Egypt, as well as in other places 
in the Arab and Islamic world (Talaat et al., 2012). The producers of the movie were 
sentenced to death by WKH 6WDWH 6HFXULW\ &RXUW IRU ³SURYRNLQJ VHFWDULDQLVP
EODVSKHP\ DQG HQGDQJHULQJ QDWLRQDO XQLW\ DQG VRFLDO SHDFH´ (MENA, 2013). This 
UXOLQJZDVDSSURYHGE\(J\SW¶VUHOLJLRXVHVWDEOLVKPHQW(MENA, 2013). On the other 
hand, forms of hate speech directed against other religious and ethnic communities 
receive less attention. Forms of hate speech against religious groups were conducted 
at times by state-funded media, such as Egyptian TV, in the case of the Maspero 
protests on October 9, 2011 (Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression, 
2014: 19). Other forms of hate speech against religious groups were also conducted 
by private channels (such as some Islamist channels) supporting the discourse that 
led to the lynching of four Shiites in Zawyat Abu Musalam, Giza, in 2013 (El-Gundy, 
2013). A lack of protection of minorities has led to impunity of the perpetrators and the 
repetition of these incidents (Thabet, 2015). 
 
Hate speech against ethnic and LGBT groups: As a conservative society, 
Egyptian mainstream culture rejects members of the LGBT community, viewing them 
asperverse and a threat to social peace. This has not only manifested itself in the 
media, but also in the prosecution of such conducts. While there is no law punishing 
LGBT acts, it is often proVHFXWHG DV D IRUP RI ³GHEDXFKHU\´ DQGSXEOLF LQGHFHQF\
(Whitetaker, 2014). Mainstream media programmes have presented this community 
as responsible for many social ills, as well the spread of diseases such as HIV 
(Kingsley, 2014).  
 
14 
 
The least prevalent form of hate speech is against African residents or refugees 
in Egypt and is based on racist perceptions of people of colour as violent. In this 
UHVSHFWDSURPLQHQWQHZVSDSHUHQWLWOHGLWVUHSRUWWKH³1LJJHUV7KHJDQJVRIEODFN
KRUURU´(Sharif, 2015). This form of hate speech is not tied to political ideas, unlike the 
nationalist form described above, which is politically motivated.  
 
Egyptian law and hate speech  
There is no particular law against hate speech in Egyptian legislation (Ezzat et 
al., 2014: 4). However, there are laws against religious blasphemy and against 
incitement to crime. The former protects Islam, Christianity and Judaism, which are 
recognised by the constitution as requiring protection from insult. These laws and their 
implementation fail to protect social, political and other religious groups. 
  
Religious blasphemy: Religious blasphemy is an offence under the Penal Code 
of 58/1938 (Ezzat, 2014: 15). It is directed against insults or critique of Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism, whose adherents are allowed to carry out their practices in 
public. In this respect, there are criticisms that it is discriminatory against other 
religions (Ezzat, 2014: 6)VXFKDV%DKD¶LVPZKLFKDUHQRWSURWHFWHGXQGHUWKHODZV
nor are their followers allowed to practice their religions in public. Furthermore, it is 
criticised for being implemented in a discriminatory manner. While the text of the laws 
nominally protects Islam, Christianity, and Judaism from public criticism, it has mostly 
been implemented for the protection of Islamic beliefs from critique or insults. In this 
sense, its application has been restrictive of freedom of speech and freedom of 
conscience called for by international laws (Ezzat, 2014: 6), while failing to protect a 
large range of marginalised groups. 
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Incitement: Hate speech may sometimes be prosecuted if it includes 
incitements to commit a crime. The Penal Code gives a broad definition for incitement 
that includes all serious and petty crimes or offences. Offences must take place for 
this law to be applicable, otherwise there is no criminalisation of incitement in itself 
(Ezzat et al., 2014: 24). Second, in incitement for some serious crimes (e.g. murder), 
inciting to topple the regime, incitement of soldiers not to obey orders, incitement of 
discrimination and incitement to disobey laws, are forms of incitement that the Penal 
Code penalises where no crime needs take place (Ezzat et al., 2014: 26-27). The 
problem with this definition is that it is expansive and may provide unnecessary 
restrictions on freedom of speech (Ezzat et al., 2014: 4). Further, there is no clear 
definition of hate speech as a form of speech that should be restricted. Thus, the 
implementation of these laws has led to the restriction of freedom of speech, but not 
to the reduction of hate speech. 
  
In conclusion, the aftermath of the January 25th Uprising in 2011 has witnessed 
a period of a chaotic state of media freedom, which in some cases has led to politicised 
discourses and low professional standards and professional ethics. This politicised 
discourse was polarised further by the political events leading to the June 30th 2013 
incidents in Tahrir Square. Nationalist and xenophobic discourses have also been 
used as hate speech against foreigners. Furthermore, there is evidence that hate 
speech against religious groups has resulted in much popular upheaval since 2011. 
These different forms of hate speech have not been restricted due to deficiencies in 
Egyptian laws, which do not have provisions against hate speech per se. Current 
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provisions therefore led to the restriction of freedom of speech, but fall short of 
restricting all forms of hate speech. 
 
4.2. Kenya: Responses to electoral violence: The problem of hate speech, 
peaceocracy and censorship (Alisha Patel) 
Kenya has experienced electoral violence, particularly of an inter-ethnic nature, 
since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991. In a political environment 
characterised by ethnic clientelism rather than a programmatic, or policy-based 
agenda, as well as a winner-take-all view of political power and its economic spoils ± 
ethnicity has been heavily politicised, and violence diffused and easily ignited (Mueller, 
2008). Since the adoption of multi-party politics, the language of political discourse 
emanating from political incumbents and aspirants increasingly became one of insult, 
threat and accusations, and sought to dehumanise and denigrate opponents. For 
example, in the early 1990s, Moi and his ministers used the rhetoric of fear to oppose 
multi-SDUW\LVP DQG ³VRPH UHJLPH VXSSRUWHUV WKHPVHOYHV DSSHDUHG WR DGYRFDWH
violence against political dissidents, publicly urging citizens to cut off the fingers of 
multi-party advocates, and to arm themselves with rungu (knobbed sticks) and spears 
to crush opponents of one-SDUW\UXOH´(Somerville, 2011). The Kenyan National Human 
Rights Commission report, Still Behaving Badly (KNCHR, 2007), stated that the 2007 
election had been characterised by the continued use of insults against opponents, 
threats of violence, and effective incitement to violence. It reported covert hate speech, 
defamatory and unsavoury language continued largely unabated, and Kenyans 
continued to condone and cheer hate speech and had become active agents of 
proliferation of hate campaigns against politicians and fellow Kenyans (KNCHR, 
2007). 
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The problem of hate speech in Kenya, and in particular the tensions between 
freedom of speech and dangerous and/or offensive speech, must therefore be 
considered in the context of a democratic transition in a deeply divided society with a 
long history of violent elections. The 2007 and 2013 elections reflect upon the 
difficulties of navigating this complex nexus of peace, conflict, consensus, debate, the 
right to protest and free and fair elections to achieve democratic outcomes and ideals. 
  
The contested result of the 2007 presidential election, which saw the re-election 
of Mwai Kibaki as President, culminated in an unprecedented scale and spread of 
violence that left more than 1,200 people dead and over 600,000 displaced. This 
atrocity was fuelled by hate speech acts by multiple actors and in various arenas; for 
example, through the media, particularly vernacular radio stations, as well as through 
SMS messages, and at rallies. In this setting, hate speech took the shape of 
inflammatory speech acts that aroused suspicion, fear and hatred between ethnic 
groups ± and ultimately incited inter-communal violence in an already deeply divided 
and ethnically polarised society. For example, Kass FM, one such radio station, 
EURDGFDVWFRPPHQWVE\SROLWLFLDQVDQGFRPPHQWDWRUVRQWKHQHHGIRUWKH³SHRSOHRI
WKHPLON´WR³FXWJUDVV´DQGWKHLUFRPSODLQWVWKDWWKH³PRQJRRVH´KDGFRPHDQG³VWROHQ´ 
WKHLU³FKLFNHQ´LQZKDWDPRXQWHGWRDFOHDUDWWDFNRQSDUWLFXODUHWKQLFJURXSV$WWKH
same time, the mainstream media were accused of demonstrating a high degree of 
bias towards certain political actors, as well as failing to prevent the dissemination of 
party propaganda and the violent rhetoric of many political leaders (Somerville 2011). 
  
18 
 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, drafted in the shadow of the 2007 elections 
and post-election violence, makes explicit reference to hate speech. While not 
explicitly GHILQHG LW LQYROYHV ³DGYRFDF\RIKDWUHG WKDWFRQVWLWXWHVHWKQLF LQFLWHPHQW
YLOLILFDWLRQRIRWKHUVRU LQFLWHPHQW WRFDXVHKDUP´)XUWKHU WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRXWOLQHV
WKDWDQ\ULJKWWR³IUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQ´ZKLFKXVHVVXFKODQJXDJHGRHVQRWH[WHQG
to hate speech (KLR, 2010). The National Cohesion and Integration Commission 
(NCIC) was created in 2009 as a body that would tame the use of hate speech, and 
promote national cohesion and integration. The mandate of the Commission is to 
facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful 
coexistence between persons of different ethnic and racial backgrounds in Kenya and 
to advise the government in this respect (KLR, 2010). The 2008 National Cohesion 
and Integration Act (NCIA) defines hate speech as: 
 
 A person who ± 
[a] uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any 
written material; [b] publishes or distributes written material; [c] presents or 
directs the performance the public performance of a play; [d] distributes, shows 
or plays, a recording of visual images; or [e] provides, produces or directs a 
programme; which is threatening, abusive or  insulting or involves the use of 
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour commits an offence, if such 
person intends thereby to stir up ethnic hatred, or having regard to all the 
circumstances, ethnic hatred is likely to be stirred up. Ethnic hatred means 
hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, 
nationality (including citizenship), or ethnic or national origins. (KLR, 2008) 
 
The constitutional regulation of hate speech, particularly in a transitioning 
democracy raises questions as to the reach of government control over political 
language ± specifically, how far it extends over public opinion and journalistic practice. 
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Laws on hate speech ± particularly given the context in which they have been drafted 
± have the potential to lead to either active or implicit censorship of political discourse 
in the name of fosterLQJ³SHDFH´7KLVLVLPSRUWDQWZKHQLWLQWHUSOD\VZLWKPHDQLQJIXO
and important criticism on government policy agenda. These are all vital components 
of a vibrant and meaningful democracy. 
 
The 2013 elections and electoral campaign must therefore also be viewed 
through the lens of the 2007 elections, and the terrible legacy of politically motivated 
ethnic violence. Given the role of hate speech in fuelling electoral violence, responses 
to this must be taken into consideration. The Umati project (2013), was one such 
initiative that monitored the dissemination and propagation of hate speech in the most 
prevalent languages spoken in Kenya, particularly through social media outlets. The 
need to study how this is done in several languages highlights the constant evolution 
of hate speech, as well as the need to monitor, analyse and regulate speech acts 
across a variety of forums, particularly given the growing importance of social media. 
 
Having been accused of being partially responsible for the 2007 post-election 
violence, the traditional print and broadcast media also played a different role in this 
context. Arguably there was a heavier degree of self-censorship during the 2013 
HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQZLWK.HQ\DQMRXUQDOLVWVYDOXLQJ³SHDFHRFUDF\´DOLJQLQJWKLVZLWK
responsible journalism, and in the process failing to fully engage with and scrutinise 
sensitive electoral debates, and therefore neglect to play an important role in achieving 
democratic outcomes. News coverage engaged heavily with political figures urging the 
public to ensure a peaceful election, and crucially, to accept the election result and not 
protest, and carefully avoided any content with the potential to trigger conflict; while 
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editorials and advertisements also highlighted the need for peace given the memory 
RIWKHHOHFWLRQV7KLVHFKRHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWDQ\SXEOLFVSHHFK
likely to instigate instability or threaten national unity was illegitimate, irrespective of 
whether this might impinge journalistic independence and/or undermine democratic 
values. 
 
4.3. Serbia: Hate speech and a legacy of the past (Davor Marko) 
When discussing hate speech in the Serbian media, the first thing that comes 
WRSHRSOH¶VPLQGV LV WKHSHULRGRI WKHV'XULQJ WKDW WLPH WKHPRVW LQIOXHQWLDO
media constituted the so-FDOOHG³SDWULRWLFIURQW´ZLWKGLUHFWRUVDQGHGLWRUV-in-chief loyal 
WR6ORERGDQ0LORãHYLüDQGKLV regime, enabling him to control over 90 per cent of the 
media space (Mazowiecki, 1995: 35). 7KH 0LORãHYLü UHJLPH PLVXVHG PDLQVWUHDP
media for the sake of propaganda, by employing explicit hate speech and portraying 
others as enemies .XUVSDKLü7KRPpson, 1999). Using the media as a tool for 
PDQLSXODWLRQ RYHU 6HUELDQ FLWL]HQV 0LORãHYLü¶V UHJLPH RI IHDU manipulated 
information, with the intention to re-GLUHFW WKH DXGLHQFH¶V DWWHQWLRQ IURP WKH UHDO
problems (economic and political), and focusing it elsewhere, such as on the fear of 
Islam, or from inner or external political enemies. Describing the role of propaganda in 
WKH6HUELDQUHJLPH3RGXQDYDFUHIHUVRQ7DFLWXV¶³FRUUXSWHGGLVFRXUVH´NQRZQWRGD\
as propaganda, and outlining the division between friend and enemy (minority vs. 
majority, Serbs and others, citizens and patriots, nationalists and cosmopolitans), as 
the basic reproductive principle of power (Podunavac, 2006: 261-286). Propaganda, 
used during the war(s) in the former Yugoslavia, was based on several principles: the 
purity of collective identities, the synergy of ethnicity, religions, and nationality, the 
QRWLRQRIWKH³HQHP\´DQGWKHQDUURZLQWHUHVWRISROLWLFDOHOLWHV³&RPPXQLWLHVRIIHDU
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ZHUHFUHDWHGRXWRIFRPPXQLWLHVRILQWHUHVW´ZKere ethnic hatred and fear were the 
result and those feelings still remain today (Ignatieff, 1997: 38-54). 
  
Democratisation and media: Democratisation in Serbia took place only after 
 ZKHQ 0LORãHYLü¶V UHJLPH ZDV RYHUWKURZQ 7KH QHZO\ HOHFWHG pro-European 
government established a new legal framework for the media, under the influence and 
guidance of the European Union, The Council of Europe, and the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe. Within the first, usually labelled as 
modernisation, phase of media policy in Serbia, which lasted from 2000 to 2003, 
political actors established a consensus on EU accession and applied European 
standards in the sphere of the media; in terms of privatisation, self-regulation, 
establishment of public service, and using expertise from civil society and professional 
associations 0DWLüDQG9DOLü1HGHOMNRYLü. This is the period when the most 
important laws, including those that regulate hate speech, were adopted. 
 
The Serbian Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, as 
well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through speech, 
writing, art or other manner (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006: Article 49). 
The right to freedom of expression may be restricted by law only in certain cases, in 
RUGHUWRSURWHFWWKHULJKWVRIRWKHUV7KHFULPLQDOFKDUJHRI³SURYRNLQJHWKQLFUDFLDO
DQGUHOLJLRXVO\EDVHGDQLPRVLW\DQGLQWROHUDQFH´FDUULHVDPLQLPXPVL[PRQWKVSULVRQ
term and a maximum of ten years (Republic of Serbia, 2014: Articles 174,176,177). 
  
Debates in 2000s - for and against the EU: $VDSDUWRIWKH0LORãHYLüOHJDF\
Serbian society has been characterised with severe divisions even after the formal 
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process of democratisation had begun. Prominent public debates, along ideological 
and political lines during the 2000s were shaped within the paradigm of the ³ILUVW´
EDFNZDUG DQG QDWLRQDOLVWLF DQG ³VHFRQG´ FLWL]HQ-oriented) Serbia. This paradigm 
derived from the 1990s when the entire society, as well as the media, was divided 
EHWZHHQ WKRVH ZKR VXSSRUWHG WKH UHJLPH RI 0LORãHYLü DQG WKRVH ZKR RSSRVHG LW
ýRORYLüDQG0LPLFD. 
 
On the eve of the general elections in 2008, these lines of divisions were 
mirrored in mutually exclusive discourses on the future of Serbia. The harsh debate 
was forged by three dominant political streams, each representing unique, and 
mutually excluding, ideological orientations. The Democratic Party (DS) with its 
coalition partners (lateU LQFOXGLQJ WKH ³UHIRUPHG´ 6RFLDOLVWLF 3DUW\ RI 6HUELD ZKRVH
IRXQGHU DQG 3UHVLGHQW ZDV 6ORERGDQ 0LORãHYLü RSWHG IRU WKH (XURSHDQ SDWK IRU
Serbia which they considered as an ultimate political goal, which would bring 
prosperity and wealth to Serbian society. The DS through its affiliate media employed 
the language of fear, warning Serbian citizens that two other, conservative and anti-
European, political blocs would lead Serbia to isolation, with no economic prosperity 
and direct investments.  
 
Two other blocs, one conservative (led by The Democratic Party of Serbia, 
DSS) and the other ultra-nationalist (represented by The Serbian Radical Party, SRS) 
were not in favour of EU integration. While DSS and its allies claimed that Serbia had 
more important things to do, mainly to protect its territory in Kosovo and Metohija 
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³.RVRYR LV KHDUW RI 6HUELD´ ZDV WKH PDLQPHVVDJHRI WKLV SROLWLFDO RSWLRQ3 SRS 
blamed both political parties for causing economic, political and identity crisis during 
the eight years of their government. Both sides opted for cooperation with Russia. 
There were not many explicit examples of hate speech during the 2008 election 
campaign, but mutual accusations and sophisticated language was employed. These 
were messages that polarised the Serbian public and were framed within tensions and 
deeply rooted emotions and collective memory.4 
 
Current practices: According to the International Research & Exchanges Board 
Media Sustainability Index for 2015, Serbia has an unsustainable mixed media 
sysWHP7KLVPHDQVWKDW³WKHFRXQWU\PLQLPDOO\PHHWVREMHFWLYHVZLWKVHJPHQWVRI
WKHOHJDOV\VWHPDQGJRYHUQPHQWRSSRVHGWRDIUHHPHGLDV\VWHP´(IREX, 2015: 116). 
Compared to previous years, there is a drastic drop in rankings in each of the 
categories, primarily due to economic and political downturns. Following the elections 
of March 2014, in which the leading Serbian Progressive Party won 158 out of 250 
seats in the National Assembly (with 48.35 per cent of the popular support), the media 
landscape in Serbia was affected by constant political and economic problems. This 
VLWXDWLRQLQ6HUELD³«KDVKDGDQDGYHUVHHIIHFWRQWKHPHGLDZLWKDQH[WHQVLRQRI
control and censorship, including an increase in self-censorship, which pervades the 
media industry: critical reporting is deemed seditious´(IREX, 2015: 115). There has 
been no serious effort by the current regime to improve conditions for freedom of 
                                                          
3
 3XEOLFVSHHFKHVRIWKHIRUPHU'66SUHVLGHQW9RMLVODY.RãWXQLFDDUHDYDLODble on: 
http://dss.rs/category/govori-i-analize/page/11/  
4
 As the 2008 elections demonstrated, the pro-EU bloc led by the Democratic Party gained 38.42 per 
cent of the votes, while anti-EU parties got 41 per cent - 29.46 per cent of the voters supported the 
Serbian Radical Party while 11.,62per cent of citizens voted for the Democratic Party of Serbia. See: 
Republic of Serbia - Republic Institute for Statistics. Parliamentary Elections 2008. [Online]. Available 
from: 
http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/repository/documents/00/00/24/45/Parlamentarni_Izbori_2008.pdf 
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expression and access to information. In spite of the adoption of new laws, there was 
no adequate response to violations against the media. In the past year, the most 
popular political programmes on several television stations that fostered public 
debates were cancelled. Critical discussions are limited to social networks, while 
authorities have also reportedly favoured tabloids and newspapers that provide 
salacious content (IREX, 2015: 118). 
  
Hate speech in the Serbian context has now moved to the online sphere, and 
traditional Serbian media (television, radio, press) no longer entertain that kind of 
public language, with the exception of a few tabloids that are closely tied to the 
incumbent regime and instructed on how to humiliate and blame political others. In the 
online sphere, hate speech takes the form of comments on social networks and 
websites. The State of Serbia is taking active measures against hate speech on the 
internet, primarily through a National Committee for the Fight Against Hate Speech, 
and by joining the No Hate Campaign, launched in 2013 by The Council of Europe. 
Through the activities of this national committee, more than 10,000 high school 
students have participated in workshops, as well as activities promoted by an online 
FDPSDLJQFDOOHG³1Rhate speech´(Council of Europe, 2015).  
  
4.4. South Africa: Reflections on hate speech (Wallace Chuma) 
The issue of racist (and other forms of) hate speech in South Africa today must 
be considered against the historical context of legislated racial segregation commonly 
known as Apartheid. Before the attainment of democracy in 1994, many of the 
FRXQWU\¶VODZVZHUHRYHUWO\UDFLVW7KHFRXQWU\¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRGemocracy was birthed 
by negotiations between the progressive liberation movements and the ancient 
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regime. As is the case with negotiated transitions, compromises are made in the 
process, with the effect that the new dispensation will consist of strong elements of 
both the new and the old, which often sit uneasily together.  
  
With regard to hate speech, especially racist hate speech, the sensitive history 
of racism and the desire to create a post-ASDUWKHLG GHPRFUDWLF ³UDLQERZ QDWLRQ´
characterised by among other things non-racialism, non-VH[LVPHWF WKHFRXQWU\¶V
founding fathers included a clause in the Constitution outlawing it, while at the same 
time being careful not to infringe freedom of expression. Section 16(1) of the 
Constitution makes very liberal and explicit provisions for freedom of expression, but 
this is subject to the limitation that such freedom must not extend to: a) propaganda 
for war; b) incitement to imminent violence and c) advocacy of hatred that is based on 
race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
  
In addition to the Constitution, the regulation of hate speech is also enforced 
through laws such as the Film and Publications Act and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.5 Section 10 of the latter, for example, prohibits 
any person from publishing, propagating, advocating or communicating words directed 
DJDLQVWDQRWKHUSHUVRQEDVHGDPRQJVWRWKHUV WKLQJVRQ WKDWRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V UDFH
sex, gender, sexual orientation or foreign nationality; or if those words could 
reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to be hurtful, be harmful or 
to incite harm; [or] promote or propagate hatred. 
  
                                                          
5
 See, for example: Section 16 (d) of Films and Publications Amendment Act, 2009. [Online]. 
Available from: http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a3_2009.pdf; and the Preamble to the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-004.pdf 
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Conceptually, the issue of defining and regulating hate speech in the context of 
a transitioning democracy with a history of repression presents an existential 
conundrum where on the one hand freedoms of expression so inalienable to 
democracy must be respected, and on the other forms of expression which bring back 
memories of yesteryear or lead to marginalisation or physical harm to others, need to 
be censured one way or the other. Hate speech may deter political and social 
participation by its victims, while banning it may likewise deter participation by some, 
hence the conundrum. 
  
Neisser (1994: 108) suggests two approaches to hate speech: the ethical or 
intrinsic perspective which condemns XQMXVWLILHGKDUPWRRWKHUV³ZKHWKHURUQRWWKLV
KDUPKDVSUDJPDWLFFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHOLIHRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´RUWKHLQVWUXPHQWDO
consequentialist or utilitarian perspective, which focuses on the societal 
consequences without making a priori moral judgements. Each of these approaches 
has its pros and cons. South Africa offers some interesting recent instances of hate 
speech, which reflect the complexities of drawing lines around hate speech.  
  
Racist hate speech: One fairly recent case which attracted emotive public 
debate about hate speechLQYROYHGWKHVLQJLQJRIDVWUXJJOHVRQJ³6KRRWWKHERHU
VKRRWWKHIDUPHU´E\IRUPHU$IULFDQ1DWLRQDO&RQJUHVV$1&<RXWK/HDJXH/HDGHU
Julius Malema (De Vos, 2011). The song was a rallying song during the anti-Apartheid 
years. However, in the post-Apartheid era, was there a place for these kinds of songs? 
This was the question. The matter was brought to court against Malema by the pro-
Afrikaner activist group Afriforum, and the Judge ruled that the song constituted hate 
speech and therefore should not be sung. This ruling attracted criticism from the ANC 
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and its members continued to defy the ban, in some cases modifying the tunes. 
Ironically, Malema became a sort of celebrity out of this. One of the central questions 
arising out of this case is whether having strict hate speech codes may be detrimental 
to the historically oppressed, while mustering sympathy for bigots, racial or otherwise. 
,Q6RXWK$IULFDIRUH[DPSOHWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRRURIWHQLQYRNHGDQWL-Apartheid narratives 
(including songs, toyi-toyi dancing, etc.) during the so-FDOOHG ³VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\
SURWHVWV´WRKLJKOLJKWWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRI³$SDUWKHLG-W\SH´UHVWULFWLRQVWREDVLFVHUYLFHV
in the context of neoliberal economics. Would branding some of these songs as forms 
of hate speech, where anti-Apartheid songs could not conceivably ignore the issue of 
race anyway, not have the effect of marginalizing the formerly oppressed who still live 
below the poverty line and have not yet experienced the material benefits of 
democracy two decades later? The other, related question would be whether strictly 
legislating against hate speech in this case would curtail the possibility of inter-group 
dialogue necessary to reduce discrimination. 
  
Hate speech and xenophobia: The xenophobic violence of 2008 and 2015 in 
South Africa attracted, among other things, debate about whether certain forms of 
expression had either ignited or exacerbated the violent acts against Black non-South 
Africans living in South Africa. In 2008, for example, the tabloid Daily Sun was brought 
EHIRUHWKH3UHVV2PEXGVPDQIRUFRQVLVWHQWO\UHSRUWLQJRQIRUHLJQHUVDV³DOLHQV´7KH
complainants, who included the Media Monitoring Project and the Consortium for 
Refugees and Migrants in South Africa argued that the continuous deployment of the 
³DOLHQ´ WHUP KDG WKH HIIHFW RI IXUWKHU JHQHUDWLQJ KDWUHG WRZDUGV IRUHLJQ QDWLRQDOV
Although the Press Ombudsman ruled in favour of the newspaper, the case drew 
widespread public attention (and in some cases condemnation), and interestingly in 
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its coverage of the xenophobic attacks in 2015, the same paper was more cautious 
DQGDYRLGHGWKH³DOLHQ´ODEHO 
  
The other, more recent case, relates to the utterances of the Zulu King Goodwill 
Zwelithini in March 2015. Addressing his subjects, the King said that foreigners (non-
South African Blacks), were messing the streets and must go back to their countries 
of origin. A few days after his speech, xenophobic attacks began in KwaZulu Natal, 
his province, before spreading to the region of Gauteng, and critics have argued that 
WKHVHDWWDFNVZHUHDWOHDVWLQSDUWIXHOOHGE\WKH=XOXNLQJ¶VXWWHUDQFHV7KH.LQJZDV
taken to the Human Rights Commission, and the matter is currently being investigated. 
Constitutional law expert Pierre de Vos (2015) has argued that there are sufficient 
grounds to convict King Goodwill Zwelithini on contravention of the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act. The King has, of course, denied 
inciting any violence, and argued that he was expressing an opinion. What the South 
African case studies above suggest, is that in transitioning democracies emerging from 
racial repression, regulating hate speech presents the conundrum of promoting and 
facilitating freedom of expression while at the same time ensuring that particular forms 
of expression do not transcend certain sensitive borders with the possible outcome of 
undermining the very foundations of the democracy. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This key concept paper has outlined the idea of hate speech, its relationship to 
freedom of speech, as well as the legislation that elucidates the concept at the national 
and international level. The concept of hate speech is central to debates over the role 
29 
 
of the media in fostering democratic processes and outcomes, and is unique to the 
specific media landscape, journalistic practices of a country, and the degree of 
government control of the media. Through an exploration of events and debates in the 
four county case studies of the MeCoDEM project: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South 
Africa, this paper has highlighted that considerations of the context in which debates 
over hate speech occur are extremely important, particularly in those countries that 
are transitioning to democracy and with a history of conflict. A comparative approach 
therefore invites further discussion on a number of themes to better understand the 
nature, as well as transmission and impact of hate speech.  
 
Firstly, all four case studies highlight that the issue of hate speech becomes 
more salient and prevalent during periods of political and/or economic upheaval. In the 
case of Egypt, this was during the uprisings and continued impact of the Arab Spring 
on political transitions and government responses. Hate speech has taken on 
xenophobic, political, religious and cultural forms. In Kenya, elections proved deadly 
given histories of ethnic grievances and conflict, as well as a winner-takes-all system 
of politics. In Serbia and South Africa, we are also able to see the problem of hate 
speech becomes particularly contentious during periods of economic downturn, 
contributing to xenophobic speech. The precarious economic and political situation of 
transitional societies exacerbates the risks of practices such as hate speech to be 
allowed by parties motivated by the desire for political power. 
 
Secondly, the case studies highlight the relationship between hate speech and 
the media. In most ± if not all ± of these expositions, the media is far from being an 
independent facilitator of democratic outcomes, performing a challenging and 
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educational role for the public. Instead, government control of mainstream media 
channels has led to high levels of censorship as well as hostility towards certain 
political or socio-economic groups ± crystallising the issue of journalistic best practice. 
For instance, the tight grip of 0LORãHYLü over the Serbian media led to propaganda that 
was centred upon the fear of Islam, and internal or external political enemies. 
Government control of the media contributes to an environment where hate speech 
continues unfettered and reflects the government view of certain minority groups. In 
this way, governments are able to set the terms of the political debate, constraining 
various opinions, which are important for the realisation of a meaningful and vibrant 
democracy. The media can often serve as the direct transmitter of dangerous speech 
acts, which have uniformly led to violent outcomes. This most notably occurred in 
Kenya during the 2007 elections and post-election violence, where journalists and 
radio stations presented overt, albeit coded, messages to attack and kill certain ethnic 
groups following the result. 
 
Hate speech is also linked to memory. Crucially the historical context in which 
the hate speech act occurs has lessons for the present. In South Africa, the pernicious 
and widespread effects of Apartheid not only shape legislation on hate speech today, 
but also have led to grave socio-economic imbalances. In Serbia, the impact of the 
0LORãHYLü regime has led to severe divisions between groups, and therefore 
widespread impact on democratisation processes as well as the forms that hate 
speech takes. Appreciation of the historical context in which instances of hate speech 
and alleged hate speech occur, as well as the reactions to it cannot be underestimated. 
This paper has highlighted that context is integral to fully understanding hate speech, 
as this outlines the specific relationships between ethnicity, religious affiliation, identity 
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and political environments; and how conflicts regarding these arise in cultures and 
societies that are already burdened by internal divergent factors. 
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